











Manuscript version: Working paper (or pre-print) 
The version presented here is a Working Paper (or ‘pre-print’) that may be later published 
elsewhere. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/156929                              
 
How to cite:  
Please refer to the repository item page, detailed above, for the most recent bibliographic 
citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to 
above, will contain details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 















ISSN 2059-4283 (online) 
ISSN 0083-7350 (print)  
 




Arun Advani, George Bangham and Jack Leslie 
 
(This paper also appears as CAGE Discussion paper 576) 
 
 





THE UK’S WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 
AND CHARACTERISTICS OF  
HIGH-WEALTH HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Arun Advani, University of Warwick, CAGE, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), and the LSE 
International Inequalities Institute (III). 
George Bangham, Resolution Foundation 
Jack Leslie, Resolution Foundation  
 
 
Wealth Tax Commission Evidence Paper no. 1 
 
 
Published by the Wealth Tax Commission 







This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through the 
CAGE at Warwick (ES/L011719/1) and a COVID-19 Rapid Response Grant (ES/V012657/1), by 
a grant from Atlantic Fellows for Social and Economic Equity's COVID-19 Rapid Response Fund, 
and by the Standard Life Foundation. The authors thank Hannah Tarrant and Helen Hughson for 
outstanding research assistance, and Emma Chamberlain, Carla Kidd, Salvatore Morelli, and 
Andy Summers for helpful comments. This work contains statistical data from ONS which is 
Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the 
endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This 






We show that wealth inequality in the UK is high and has increased slightly over the past decade 
as financial asset prices increased in the wake of the financial crisis. But data deficiencies are a 
major barrier in understanding the true distribution, composition and size of household wealth. 
The most comprehensive survey of household wealth in the UK does a good job of capturing the 
vast majority of the wealth distribution, but that nearly £800 billion of wealth held by the very 
wealthiest UK households is missing. We also find tentative evidence that survey measures of 
high-wealth families undervalue their assets – our central estimate of the true value of wealth 






In high-income Western economies during much of the twentieth century, economic questions 
of distribution – of income or other variables – seemed of secondary importance to those of 
macroeconomic growth (Lucas, 1988; Krugman, 1997). This focus for research was more 
understandable in an era of economic expansion, broadly rising living standards and falling 
inequality. But in the past 40 years trends of falling inequality have faltered or even reversed 
(Atkinson, 2005; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Piketty and Saez, 2003). More recently, trends in 
growth and productivity have slowed down too (Crafts, 2018; Crafts and Mills, 2020). With a 
lag, economists’ interests have followed suit: high-profile research on income distribution paved 
the way for a more recent wider focus on other types of inequality such as that of wealth, 
particularly since the publication of Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty, 2014; 
Garbinti,  Goupille-Lebret and Piketty, 2021; Saez and Zucman, 2016, 2020a,b; Smith Zidar 
Zwick 2020; Artola Blanco, Bauluz and Martínez-Toledano, 2021). This research has led 
policymakers to think more about the distribution and growth of wealth, as well as options for 
taxing it (Advani, Chamberlain and Summers, 2020a).  
This paper studies the wealth distribution of the UK.1  Using survey data on private wealth we 
estimate wealth inequality, the composition of wealth holdings, and the characteristics of high 
wealth households. We then augment the survey measure using data from the Sunday Times 
Rich List (STRL) and a Pareto distribution-based imputation for ‘missing wealth’. We find that 
true levels of wealth (and of wealth inequality) are substantially higher than those shown in 
statistics based purely on surveys. 
A detailed understanding of the distribution of wealth matters when designing wealth taxes in 
at least three distinct ways. First, it helps policymakers to gauge the likely welfare impact of 
changes to the tax regime for wealth: in particular what the characteristics of people affected 
would be with respect to present income, age, location and other key variables. Second, to the 
extent that taxation seeks to reduce inequality in well-being, wealth may directly influence this 
well-being so be the proper subject of independent taxation (Saez and Stantcheva, 2018). It is 
therefore necessary to understand how wealth it distributed. It is worth noting, however, that 
whether wealth contains more information about lifetime resources than can be learned from 
income and consumption is a matter of some controversy (Adam and Miller, 2021). Third, the 
combination of tax structure and wealth distribution – along with any behavioural responses to 
the tax – determine how much revenue will be raised (Advani, Hughson and Tarrant, 2021). 
Distributional analysis of wealth ownership demands a dataset that measures both wealth and 
other personal characteristics. At present, the ONS Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) is the only 
such comprehensive dataset available for Great Britain,2 so it forms the core of our analysis. We 
 
1 Though we refer to the UK throughout this paper, our data exclude Northern Ireland, Northern Scotland 
(north of the Caledonian canal), and individuals living in residential institutions such as prisons, university 
accommodation, and care homes. As a result, we miss around 2% of the UK population. Unless these areas 
are drastically different from the rest of the UK, it is unlikely that our distributional results are 
substantially affected. In principle, if the distribution of wealth in these areas is identical to what we 
observe elsewhere, we could increase our aggregate measures of wealth by 2%, but given the inherent 
uncertainty involved in using survey data, we do not take this approach, and we do not expect it to change 
our results substantially. We do include some of the wealthiest individuals in the areas omitted from the 
survey data, as these individuals are captured in the Sunday Times Rich List which we use to supplement 
our estimates. 
2 Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive survey of wealth in Northern Ireland comparable to the ONS 
Wealth and Assets Survey, though Hillyard, Patsios and Feely (2014) do provide some evidence on wealth 




find that the top three household net wealth deciles held a larger share of wealth in 2016–18 
than ten years earlier, and the middle 50% shrank.  This has been driven by rising financial 
wealth relative to property wealth. Importantly, average gains in financial wealth over the past 
decade are explained more by passive capital gains than by active saving,3 and wealth gains have 
accrued mostly to families that already held financial assets. We find that a major driver of rising 
inequality is that wealthy families’ financial portfolios contain a greater share of high-yielding 
assets (consistent with Bach, Calvet and Sodini, 2020; Fagereng et al., 2020), and show that 
population ageing alone does not explain very much of the recent change in the distribution of 
wealth. 
Lower wealth households (the second and third net wealth decile) have a larger share of wealth 
in physical assets (largely consumer durables) than in other broad asset classes, while wealth for 
the fifth to eighth deciles is dominated by property, and for the top two deciles dominated by 
pensions. Financial wealth is much more prevalent in the wealthiest decile, and its composition 
varies substantially across net wealth deciles, though even the wealthiest families have a 
significant share in low-yielding assets. Bach, Calvet and Sodini (2020) report similar findings in 
Sweden, with pensions and home equity more substantial towards to the bottom and middle of 
the distribution, but a growing importance of financial wealth and towards the top, and private 
business wealth at the very top. This pattern is replicated again in France (Garbinti, Goupille-
Lebret and Piketty, 2021). 
We also consider the characteristics of high-wealth families who would likely be impacted by 
the introduction of a wealth tax, and the types of wealth they hold. They are clustered in 
working-age cohorts close to retirement, and are more likely to be male than female. There are 
large geographical divides, with high-wealth families much more concentrated in the South East 
of England than in the rest of Great Britain. They are also largely a stable population over time 
with relatively little movement into the top: 80% of those in the top decile of wealth in 2014-16 
remained in the top decile two years later, and almost all (90%) entrants to this group came from 
the next decile.  Finally, the composition of high-wealth families’ wealth holdings is much more 
dominated by business and financial assets (and relatively less by property and pensions) for 
those families with net wealth over £5 million per adult than for families with lower wealth 
levels. 
A well-known problem with household surveys is that it can be difficult to capture a complete 
representative sample of all individuals: top individuals are typically under-covered (Jenkins, 
2017; Burkhauser et al., 2018; Advani, Summers and Tarrant, 2021). Capital income is 
particularly likely to be under-estimated (Advani, Ooms and Summers, 2021), so the problem of 
under-coverage may be more severe for wealth (i.e. capital holdings). We explore this problem, 
with a particular focus on the very wealthiest families in the UK, using the Sunday Times Rich 
List. Our analysis finds that the WAS does a remarkably good job at capturing some of the 
wealthiest people in the UK but that there is likely to be at least some undercount in official 
estimates of total wealth. Further, we find evidence from fitting a Pareto distribution to UK 
wealth data (often found to be a good fit of the upper wealth tail of the wealth distribution in a 
range of contexts) that both the WAS and the STRL underestimate family wealth at the very top 
of the distribution. Adjusting for these deficiencies by adding in wealth captured in the STRL 
that is not captured in the WAS, and subsequently accounting for additional missing wealth 
using a Pareto adjustment, increases survey estimates of total wealth by 5% in our central 
estimate, adding almost £800 billion in wealth. Around half of this comes from simply adding 
wealth captured in the STRL that is not recorded in the WAS. 
 




Our findings extend existing information about both aggregate wealth and the concentration of 
wealth at the top. There exist a number of existing aggregate wealth series for the UK, including 
based on the national accounts (World Inequality Database, n.d.), inheritance tax records 
(HMRC, 2005; Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 2018) and the Wealth and Assets Survey (ONS, 
2019a; Credit Suisse, 2019). These series reach quite different results as to total wealth in the 
UK (Advani, Chamberlain and Summers, 2020b), in part because they have different target 
definitions of wealth. We provide a precise definition of, conceptually, what it is we think ought 
to be measured when considering private wealth that would potentially be relevant for a wealth 
tax. Using the WAS, we are able to provide up-to-date numbers on both aggregate wealth and 
the concentration of wealth. Relative to previous estimates on top wealth for the UK 
(Vermeulen, 2018), our top wealth adjustment uses a relatively large sample of top wealth 
observations (1000 in the STRL), and our Pareto adjustment focuses on adjusting business 
wealth from the WAS, which we argue is more closely related to what is being measured in the 
top wealth data. The effect of these adjustments – as well as the inclusion of business wealth – 
is that aggregate wealth is higher than UK official figures (ONS, 2019a), as is the share of wealth 
going to the top decile. Our estimates for the share of wealth held by the top 1 per cent and top 
10 per cent are higher than previous academic estimates for the UK (Alvaredo et al., 2018; 
Vermeulen, 2018). This brings the UK in line with the equivalent shares in France (Garbinti, 
Goupille-Lebret and Piketty, 2021), though still substantially below that of the US (Piketty, Saez 
and Zucman, 2018). 
Beyond these headline numbers, our data allow us to describe the characteristics of both wealth 
holders and their wealth at difference points of the wealth distribution. Understanding more 
about who receives top income has been an important focus of recent academic work (Bell and 
Van Reenen, 2014; Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2018; Smith et al., 2019; Advani and Summers, 
2020b; Advani et al., 2020a), but much less is known about recipients of top wealth since wealth 
figures are often constructed indirectly, based on tax data which are much more limited in the 
demographic information they contain. Using survey data, our unadjusted top share wealth 
numbers match tax-based top shares for the UK (Alvaredo et al., 2018), but we observe wealth 
measured alongside other demographic information so can speak to these wider questions 
(Fagereng et al., 2020; Runnymede Trust, 2020). We can also study not only individual wealth 
but family wealth – something that is not observable in UK tax data, where tax is (predominantly) 
individual. This is important because wealth is often shared within families.  
Finally, we make a methodological contribution by clarifying what can be learned from different 
types of data source on wealth. Researchers wishing to study the wealth distribution have 
access to a number of possible data sources: household surveys, administrative data from 
income and inheritance tax, and lists of large wealth-holders (Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 
2016; Crawford, Innes and O’Dea, 2016). We highlight both what these can tell us about the 
ownership of wealth, as well as the limitations of the different methods for studying the amount 
and distribution of wealth. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the available data in the UK on 
household wealth, and the approach we have taken to analyse it. Section 3 describes the size 
and distribution of household wealth in the UK. Section 4 analyses the gaps in the available data, 
and the impact on estimates of the wealth distribution after accounting for deficiencies in data 





2. Data and methodology 
The primary challenge in understanding the scale and distribution of wealth in the UK is the data 
available for research. Broadly speaking, there are three key types of data: first, survey-based 
data collecting households’ self-reported wealth holdings – key here is the Office for National 
Statistics’ (ONS) Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS); second, administrative data collected for tax 
purposes, one example is the data on the value of estates at death for inheritance tax; and finally, 
data compiled for other purposes such as the Sunday Times Rich List (STRL). Each of the datasets 
entails significant challenges in allowing us to produce comprehensive estimates of the 
distribution of wealth in the UK (for a wider discussion see Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 
2016). 
2.1 Survey data 
The WAS provides the most comprehensive wealth data available in the UK, both in terms of 
who it covers and what assets are covered. It has been conducted since 2006 with the purpose 
of capturing very granular information on the value of household wealth – both assets and 
liabilities – at the individual and household level. The ONS produces summary statistics and 
allows researchers access to anonymised microdata.4 This allows us to produce detailed analysis 
by asset and liability type broken down by key characteristics of the individual or household.  
The WAS samples private households with an address in Great Britain. In principle, this means 
the survey could capture those who only live in Great Britain part-time who are not strictly 
‘resident’, though in practice it is unlikely that many such individuals respond to the survey. 
Individuals who are resident but non-citizen are also within the scope of the survey.5 The survey 
is unlikely to fully capture the wealth of families where one family member lives outside the UK, 
as this individual would not be interviewed or classified as a member of the household, and their 
wealth (unless owned jointly with an eligible household member) would not be captured. The 
sample excludes individuals living in residential institutions, such as retirement homes, nursing 
homes, prisons, barracks or university halls of residence, and homeless people. We therefore do 
not observe the wealth of these individuals, who number approximately 1.2 million (Corlett et 
al., 2018). 
There are three major challenges that face researchers using the WAS. First, the time series is 
relatively short which does not allow the data to be placed within its long-run historical context. 
Second, it is hard to value some types of assets (largely non-financial assets) which do not have 
a clear market price; the survey is designed to rely on the self-reported subjective value of these 
assets which may introduce biased valuations.6 Third, and perhaps most importantly for this 
paper, some wealth is unlikely to be captured by the WAS. This is due to unit non-response 
where richer households are less likely to respond to the survey,7 item non-response where 
survey respondents fail to include their assets, particularly business assets, and indirect holding 
of wealth through trusts and other vehicles, particularly at the very top of the distribution. 
Despite these challenges, the WAS remains the best source of data on the wealth holdings 
across much of the UK’s wealth distribution; indeed, since its inception, the survey has formed 
 
4 See, for example, ONS (2020). 
5 We discuss data issues relating to residency and citizenship further in Section 4.3. 
6 Appleyard and Rowlingson (2010) note that there is some evidence of overestimating the value of 
housing in early waves of the WAS, and the same appears to be true in later waves (ONS, 2018). We 
discuss this issue further in Section 4.3). 
7 The ONS attempt to account for lower response rates among wealthier households by over-sampling 




the bedrock of much of the recent analysis of wealth in the UK, for example, Crawford, Innes 
and O’Dea (2016) and D’Arcy and Gardiner (2017). 
2.2 Administrative data 
For analysing changes to existing taxes, administrative data have the clear advantage of 
covering the full population of those paying the tax. But the UK does not have an existing 
comprehensive wealth tax meaning that there is no complete administrative dataset on wealth 
holdings in the UK.  Inheritance tax data are available for taxable wealth held at death by people 
whose estates require probate.8 Capital income taxes (taxes on income from wealth) mean 
administrative data also cover wealth which produces taxable income, from which it is possible 
to estimate the value of the underlying asset,9 but assets which don’t generate income will be 
missed, such as owner-occupied homes. While consistency of definition and legal requirements 
to report ensure that administrative data are of good quality for individuals who are required to 
report, not all individuals, and not all assets, will be covered. For example, inheritance tax data 
only cover around half of the population, and there is no requirement to report the value of 
assets which are not subject to taxation, such as pensions. It is not clear to what extent 
inheritance tax data cover even the top of the distribution. There is no empirical evidence on 
how the likelihood of requiring probate varies across the wealth distribution, and there is an 
established tax advice industry helping the wealth to avoid both inheritance tax and the probate 
process. Tax planning may also affect the extent to which reported wealth captured accurately 
reflects the wealth of the living population. For example, most lifetime gifts of cash do not need 
to be reported however substantial, unless the donor dies within seven years, and such transfers 
of wealth do not have to be shown on any probate forms or on the recipient’s tax return.   
Some of these administrative data have been used to analyse the top of the UK’s wealth 
distribution in previous research – specifically inheritance tax data. Alvaredo, Atkinson and 
Morelli (2018) estimate the share of wealth at the top of the distribution since the nineteenth 
century, using ‘mortality multipliers’ that treat the deceased as a sample of the living population. 
This approach is valuable as it would theoretically capture all high-wealth estates and thus is not 
subject to the high-wealth unit non-response present in the WAS. However, though inheritance 
tax data capture 100% of estates with an inheritance tax liability, it may fail to capture the 
wealth held in estates valued above the exemption threshold (currently £325,000 per person) if 
no inheritance tax is due, even if probate is required. This is because non-taxpaying estates, such 
as those where the deceased is resident but non-domiciled,10 or estates claiming exemptions 
and reliefs, 11 are not necessarily required to report all assets.  A further concern is that the 
wealth observed on death is not representative of the wealth of the living as individuals nearing 
death may engage in ‘deathbed planning’. 
 
8 Despite the name, inheritance tax (IHT) data cover all estates requiring probate, regardless of whether 
any IHT is due on the estate. This means that they cover estates valued below the exemption threshold 
for IHT (currently £325,000), if probate is required on at least one of the assets making up the estate. 
9 This approach estimates the level of wealth across the distribution by applying asset return rates to 
more readily observed capital income.  However, it is very sensitive to assumptions about the rate of 
return, with small differences in return rate assumptions leading to large changes in estimated wealth – 
see Smith, Zidar and Zwick (2020), and Saez and Zucman (2020a, 2020b). 
10 If the deceased is non-domiciled, inheritance tax is only due on assets located in the UK, and they are 
not obliged to report the total value of worldwide assets.  Conversely, the data include the estates of 
individuals who are domiciled but are not resident in the UK, as these are chargeable to IHT. 
11 Some assets classes receive full tax relief (such as agricultural and business property); while data is 
available for these assets, they may not properly reflect true values because the tax authority has no 




But the major drawback, in so far as we would want to study the whole wealth distribution, is 
that inheritance tax data fail to capture key parts of it. Inheritance tax data only cover estates 
requiring probate, which is roughly half of all estates passing on death (HMRC, 2019, p.4).  Many 
smaller estates do not require probate, nor do estates which are jointly held and pass 
automatically to the surviving spouse (potentially including some high-value estates). There are 
no hard rules determining whether probate is required, and it is difficult establish how probate 
incidence, and thus inclusion in the data, varies across the wealth distribution.  Estates data also 
do not cover all asset classes, with pension assets and some assets held in trust being excluded. 
This means that the data are insufficient for the purpose of this paper to summarise the entire 
wealth distribution.  
2.3 Adjusting top wealth 
The approach taken in this paper is to rely on the WAS as the basis for the primary analysis (see 
Section 3) as it is the most comprehensive and detailed summary of household wealth. Following 
these results, we provide analysis of the scale of any missing wealth not covered by the WAS and 
indicative results after adjusting for these gaps (see Section 4). 
In order to calculate the amount of wealth at the top of the wealth distribution which is not 
captured by the WAS, we utilise the STRL which provides summaries of the wealth held by the 
wealthiest individuals and families in the UK. Unfortunately, these two datasets are not 
completely comparable; this is unsurprising given that the STRL data is produced primarily from 
holdings of business assets and does not include other asset types, such as housing (Watts, 
2020). The authors also take a cautious approach with liabilities, to ensure that the wealth of 
those at the top is not over-estimated. The STRL is therefore best thought of as a lower bound 
on the wealth levels of the very wealthiest families in the UK.12 
Combining the STRL and the WAS will capture more of the wealth distribution than either does 
alone but it is possible that there will be wealth holdings which are not properly captured by 
either dataset. In order to estimate this potential gap, we utilise an approach taken by 
Vermeulen (2018) and Bach, Thiemann and Zucco (2019). This approach assumes that the top 
tail of the wealth distribution matches a Pareto distribution, which is commonly found to be the 
case for both the wealth and income distributions (Jones, 2015). The Pareto distribution is 
estimated using the combined WAS and STRL sample. The total estimated wealth under the full 
Pareto distribution is then compared to the survey data – if the data is found to underestimate 
total wealth relative to the Pareto distribution, then that represents the missing wealth not 
captured by either survey.  
2.4 What wealth and for whom? 
There are two final important methodological considerations: what assets are included within 
the definition of total wealth and what is the appropriate economic unit to analyse.  
What wealth 
The definition of wealth is not straightforward. For example, private pension assets are not 
readily convertible into other forms of wealth for someone of working age and therefore have 
 
12 STRL data are (in some cases) reported for ‘families’ rather than individuals or households as defined in 
WAS. In our analysis of the combined WAS and STRL data, we use household-level WAS data, and assume 
each observation in the STRL represents one household. It is also worth noting that from conversations 
with a number of advisors to the ultrawealthy, there are a number of very high wealth families who are 
not covered by the STRL data, not least because they may use vehicles such as trusts and foundations to 




no direct impact on living standards, although awareness of future pension receipts may affect 
one’s current desire to save. There is no inherently correct answer, rather the definition of 
wealth depends on the purpose for which it is being used. We take an approach which attempts 
to be as comprehensive as possible in measuring private wealth, and excludes other wealth. This 
means our primary definition of net wealth includes all private pension assets, financial assets, 
other business assets, physical assets and property assets net of formal and informal financial 
liabilities. This definition has both principled and practical benefits. In principle it is clear, 
drawing a line between assets which one has a legal claim to, which is the definition that would 
be most appropriate for a wealth tax (Advani, Chamberlain and Summers, 2020), and those one 
does not. It is also easier to implement in practice because – while there are still many 
challenging valuation issues (Daly, Hughson and Loutzenhiser, 2021) – the assets that are 
included are relatively easier to attach financial values to than other items which might be 
considered as part of wealth (e.g. human capital). 
Accordingly, we do not include a measure of the expected individual value for future state 
pension (social security) payments. Clearly there is a relationship between the existence of state 
pensions and household saving decisions (Lachowska and Myck, 2018) but there is no 
contractual obligation for the government to maintain future pension payments at levels 
currently expected. In which case, if one wanted to include such benefits, a more consistent 
alternative approach would be to include the effective value of an individual’s entitlement to the 
entire existing social security system, rather than pensions specifically. As explained above, such 
wealth is outside the scope of what we intend to measure. If we were to include it, our conjecture 
is that it would largely represents a level shift in wealth holdings (albeit varying by age and other 
characteristics) and not substantially affect our analysis of high wealth families. Clearly this 
‘wealth’ would not be relevant for a government if it were considering introducing a wealth tax. 
For the same reasons we also do not include wider measures of wealth, such as the benefit an 
individual gets from the environment and other natural assets (Dasgupta, 2021).  
The economic rationale behind excluding human capital is more difficult. Again we exclude it 
because there is no straightforward measure available, one doesn’t have a legal claim over it, 
and it could not realistically be directly taxed. However, it clearly varies substantially across 
individuals and economically it is an important store of value, with a large share of investment 
by young people taking the form of human capital (Jorgenson and Pachon, 1983). It is likely to 
be positively correlated with wealth, since human capital is positively related to income, and 
income rank is correlated with wealth rank (Jäntti et al., 2013; Kuhn et al., 2020; Fisher et al., 
2021). Much of the return to human capital is received as (financial) income over the course of 
an individual’s working life, so the value of it is also likely to be negatively correlated with age as 
the number of remaining working years reduces. Estimates of wealth inequality that included 
human capital would therefore likely have higher levels of inequality, but a shallower age 
gradient. Although we do not attempt to measure this directly for the reasons set out above, we 
approximate a cross-sectional measure of wealth inequality accounting for human capital by 
showing wealth inequality among wealth holders close to retirement (see Appendix F). 
Retirement is the decision to stop receiving a financial return on the human capital an individual 
has built up. This does not mean that the human capital disappears, and access to it still provides 
insurance for retirees who may return to the labour market if needed. However, despite this 
possibility of return, we can think of retirement as a reasonable proxy for the exhaustion of 
human capital, so that (to a first approximation) on retirement tangible and financial assets are 
the only personal wealth an individual owns. The exclusion of human capital is therefore likely 
to have a much smaller effect on individual wealth, although it is worth noting there are many 





We make two adjustments to the survey data. First, we reduce the reported value of physical 
assets. These are inherently hard to value as there are important choices about whether to 
measure the replacement value, market value, insurance value or something else (Daly et al., 
2021), and the WAS survey design does not always ask for consistent valuations for wealth. 
Since we wish to capture market value, we reduced the reported value of home contents, 
theoretically measured at replacement value, by 75% to be more consistent with market values 
of other asset classes (this is broadly in line with the analysis of new vs used eBay data by Advani, 
Hughson and Tarrant, 2021).  
Second, we impute some additional business wealth in the early waves of WAS. There has been 
a substantial expansion in the coverage of business wealth in WAS over time. This has resulted 
in a doubling of the number of individuals reporting non-zero business wealth in recent rounds, 
compared with the earlier years of WAS. In the first wave of the survey (covering 2006-2008), 
almost 97 per cent of survey respondents were classified as not having private business wealth; 
this fell to 95 per cent in the latest round of the survey (with the most recent round of the survey 
reasonably closely matching business population estimates, suggesting good coverage). The 
improvement in data coverage appears to have primarily been driven by improvements in the 
survey questions, with the number of private business wealth-related variables increasing by 
around two thirds. Since the current round lines up well with external aggregates, our view is 
that this is accurate. We are therefore confident in the baseline wealth we measure in WAS in 
the most recent round. To account for undercoverage of business wealth in the earlier period, 
we impute wealth back into the previous waves, which raises historic measured baseline wealth. 
If instead one thought that the WAS measure of business wealth were correct historically (or 
even just that business wealth were historically much lower than at present), our approach 
would overestimate the level of wealth held by top shares historically, and consequently 
underestimate the growth of top share inequality. 
Whose wealth 
Wealth can be measured for different economic units: individuals, families (meaning single 
adults or couples with any dependent children) or households (meaning everyone living in the 
same dwelling).13 There are advantages and disadvantages of taking different approaches. It is 
more natural to think about wealth as held by the family unit given that resources are typically 
shared freely between members of a family. But there tend to be differences between 
individuals within families – one obvious example is that women tend to have much lower 
pension wealth as a result of lower average wages and the likelihood of taking time out of the 
labour market for childcare (B&CE, 2019). This means that analysis at the household or family 
level can under-represent some of the inequalities in wealth holdings. For the analysis which 
follows, we rely on wealth per adult within family units. Appendices B, C and D repeat much of 




13 Often households and family units will overlap but not always – for example, family units would treat 




3. The distribution of UK household wealth 
3.1 Inequality in household wealth 
Household wealth in the UK is large and is held very unequally. Total net household wealth as a 
share of national income has approximately doubled over the past thirty years (Bangham and 
Leslie, 2020). Measures of wealth inequality suggest that it is twice as unequally held as income 
(Crawford, Innes and O’Dea, 2016).14 Understanding the size and shape of wealth in the UK is 
vitally important for policymakers and is an important context for the increasing interest in 
wealth taxes in the UK. This section explores the topic in more depth. 
Long-run estimates of the UK wealth distribution (Figure 1) show that the share of wealth at the 
top of the distribution fell markedly during the early and mid-twentieth Century, since then top 
wealth shares have remained fairly stable.15 This is a trend which has been repeated across many 
countries (Piketty, 2014). It is partially a function of similar changes in income inequality; 
naturally, those with higher income are more likely to be able to save and thus accumulate 
wealth over time (Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004). But, as discussed later, there are significant 
macroeconomic trends which influence the size of wealth and the shape of the wealth 
distribution which are unrelated to the broader trends affecting income inequality. In other 
words, more recent changes in wealth are less to do with income and saving than they would 
have been in the past. 
FIGURE 1: SHARE OF NET PERSONAL WEALTH HELD BY RICHEST ONE AND 10 PER CENT: UK AND GB 
 
Notes: World inequality database estimates refer to the whole of the UK and the WAS-based estimates exclude 
Northern Ireland. Due to changes in the coverage of business assets between survey rounds in the WAS, these results 
are adjusted using the latest observation of private business wealth shares held by the top 10% and 1% in the most 
recent round of the survey (2016–18) and imputed backwards to provide a consistent estimate. The definition of 
wealth used for the long-run estimates is not consistent with that from the WAS; Appendix A provides alternative 
estimates of top wealth shares which address some of these differences.  
 
14 However, recent work by Advani and Summers (2020b) suggests income inequality is being under-
measured, so is somewhat closer to wealth inequality. 
15 We later show how these results are changed by the imputation of under-reported wealth. In Appendix 
A we also show that the level and dynamics of wealth inequality in recent years depends on the definition 




Source:  Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 2018, obtained from the World Inequality Database, 2020; ONS, Wealth 
and Assets Survey. 
Drilling down into the available WAS data (which starts in 2006), we can see that there has been 
a compositional shift in the wealth distribution: wealthier families hold a higher share of wealth 
today than was the case a decade ago, while those in the middle hold a smaller share of wealth 
(Figure 2). This shift is relatively small when compared to the changes seen throughout the 
twentieth century. A commonly used alternative measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient, has 
shown a very slight rise in inequality over this period, going from 0.61 in 2006–2008 to 0.63 in 
2016–2018 (ONS, 2019a). This suggests a smaller rise in inequality than that implied by the rise 
in share of wealth held at the top, because the increase in top-wealth shares has been offset by 
small improvements at the bottom of the wealth distribution. 
FIGURE 2: SHARE OF TOTAL NET FAMILY WEALTH BY EACH NET WEALTH DECILE SINCE 2006-2008: GB 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the family level – single or couple adults and any dependent children within a 
household. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, pension assets, and an adjusted measure of 
physical wealth (including cars, home contents, collectibles, etc.). Private business assets are excluded due to material 
improvements in the coverage of these assets since the early rounds of the survey making cross-round comparisons 
difficult, given the level of uncertainty about how business wealth should be imputed at decile level. Figure B1 shows 
the same graph constructed using individuals as the unit of analysis. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
Unsurprisingly, wealth levels vary substantially across the distribution. The average family in 
the poorest 10% of families has negative net wealth – i.e. their debts exceed their assets, while 
the median family has just over £100,000 in net wealth per adult and the top 1% has almost 
£5 million per adult in the family.16 Figure 3a and b show the average wealth holdings for each 
adult within family groups across the wealth distribution. The large gaps between families has a 
profound effect on living standards as well as mobility across the wealth distribution. To put the 
scale of these gaps in context, the UK median net disposable household income was around 
£23,000 in 2018–19 (Brewer et al., 2020); it would require more than 400 years for the median 
household saving all disposable income to move from median wealth to reach the average 
wealth of the richest 1%. 
 
16 Note that a family who are ‘just’ in the top 1% have £1.9 million wealth per adult. The mean per-adult 
wealth of a family in the top 1% is much higher than this because it is an average that includes the 




FIGURE 3A: AVERAGE NET WEALTH PER ADULT PER FAMILY WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 
2016-2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the family level – single or couple adults and any dependent children within a 
household. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, pension assets, business assets and an 
adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, collectibles, etc). Figures B2 and C1 show this 
graph using individuals and households as the unit of analysis, respectively. Figure D1 shows this graph using an 
alternative wealth definition which excludes main homes and pension wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
FIGURE 3B: AVERAGE NET WEALTH PER ADULT PER FAMILY WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH PERCENTILE FOR 
THE WEALTHIEST 10 PER CENT: GB, 2016-2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the family level – single or couple adults and any dependent children within a 
household. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, pension assets, business assets and an 
adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, collectibles, etc). Figures B3 and C2 show this 
graph using individuals and households as the unit of analysis, respectively. Figure D2 shows this graph using an 
alternative wealth definition which excludes main homes and pension wealth. 




3.2 Composition of household wealth 
Household wealth in the WAS is decomposed into five asset classes: property wealth (net), 
physical wealth, private pension wealth, financial wealth (net), and business assets. Net property 
wealth consists of self-valuations of any property owned by the household, net of any loans or 
mortgages secured on the property. Physical wealth includes the estimated value of all 
household contents, including antiques, artwork, and vehicles. Private pension wealth is the 
value of all occupational and personal pensions, including both defined contribution and defined 
benefit pensions, as well as pensions in payment. Financial wealth includes the value of formal 
investments such as bank or building society current or savings accounts, ISAs, endowments, 
stocks and shares, informal savings, and children’s assets, less financial liabilities. This includes 
shares in public and private corporations, the main source of wealth measured in the Sunday 
Times Rich List. Business assets, in contrast, include the value of assets used within a business in 
which the respondent is self-employed, or is a director or partner. This includes unincorporated 
businesses, and is unlikely to closely match the STRL concept of ‘business wealth’, which largely 
reflects shares in public or private corporations. 
Private pension wealth can be difficult to value. Defined contribution (DC) pensions, which take 
the form of a pot of savings accumulated by individuals over their working lives, can be valued 
simply as the fund value held in the pension pot at a particular point in time, much in the same 
way as funds held in a savings account can be valued. Defined benefit (DB) pensions and 
pensions that have been annuitised are more complex. These pensions promise a guaranteed 
income stream from the point at which an individual retires, which for DB schemes is often 
based on the individual’s average or final salary. The ONS calculate the value of DB pensions and 
pensions in payment by estimating the size of a DC pension pot that would be required to 
purchase an annuity with the same guaranteed income.17 For pensions not already in payment, 
this is discounted to give a present value using a discount rate which can vary over time in line 
with inflation.18 As a result, the value of DB pensions can vary over time with external economic 
factors even if there is no change in income provided in retirement. 
There is significant heterogeneity in the types of assets held by families across the wealth 
distribution (see Figure 4). Poorer families tend to have very little gross property or financial 
wealth and are more likely to have financial debts exceeding assets than a typical family – this 
means that physical assets make up a much higher proportion of their overall wealth. This 
pattern reverses for wealthier families: net property wealth is the most important source of 
wealth for the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth deciles, while physical assets make up a very small 
share of the total wealth for the richest families. Pension assets make up the largest source of 
net wealth of all asset types and is remarkably stable across the wealth distribution at the fourth 
decile and above. Poorer households are much less likely to have private pension wealth, likely 
reflecting lower capacity to save for retirement due to low income, although there is some 
evidence that in recent years more families across the wealth distribution now have access to 
defined contribution pension wealth as a result of auto-enrolment (Slaughter, 2020). 
Holdings of financial and business wealth vary widely across the wealth distribution, and this is 
particularly the case for the very wealthiest families: 30% of wealth for the richest 10% of 
families comes from financial or business assets. This contrasts with just 12% of the total wealth 
for the next richest decile. Financial assets are both more liquid, and are not typically associated 
with consumption flows. It can therefore be expected that the higher prevalence of financial 
assets, particularly for the wealthiest 10% of families, can provide an important cushion in times 
 
17 For the methodological details, see the Wealth and Assets Survey User Guide Round 6 (ONS). 
18 The discount rate used by the ONS is the Superannuation Contributions Adjusted for Past Experience 




of economic crisis. Liquid financial assets can be readily used to support consumption if income 
falls, while other asset types are much harder to convert (e.g. property) or effectively impossible 
(e.g. pension wealth for working age families) making liquidity constraints more problematic 
(Pissarides, 1978; Deaton, 1991; Attanasio, 1999, Carroll, 2001).  
The types of financial asset held also varies across the wealth distribution. Poorer families hold 
the vast majority of their financial wealth in cash or current accounts (‘Zero-return assets’ in 
Figure 5) likely as a result of needing to use their available financial assets for liquidity. Richer 
households hold increasingly risky assets – which are also the types of financial assets which 
appreciate in value when stock and bond prices increase. But even the richest households tend 
to hold a significant share of their financial wealth in low-yielding and safe assets. In practice, 
the main way most UK families expose themselves to financial market returns is via their 
pension savings. 
 
FIGURE 4: AVERAGE SHARE OF TOTAL NET WEALTH CONTRIBUTED FROM DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES BY 
FAMILY NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Individuals are allocated to deciles based on wealth measured at family level. The lowest decile is excluded as 
net wealth is negative. Property wealth here is measured net of mortgage debt and financial wealth is net of other 
financial liabilities. Figure B4 shows this graph using individuals as the unit of analysis. Figure C3 shows this graph 
using households as the unit of analysis. Figure D3 shows the average share of total net wealth contributed from 
different asset classes when main homes and pension wealth are excluded. 




FIGURE 5: COMPOSITION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS BY FAMILY NET WEALTH DECILE: GB 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Individuals are allocated to deciles based on total wealth measured at family level. Zero-return assets include 
cash, current accounts and other informal financial assets. Savings assets include savings accounts (i.e. interest-
bearing sight deposit accounts) and national savings products. Safe assets include ISA accounts,19 saving bonds (i.e. 
fixed term saving accounts), unit and investment trusts, insurance products and other formal financial assets. Risky 
assets include domestic and overseas shares and bonds.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
 
3.3 Changes in wealth levels 
Financial Wealth 
A hugely important trend for financial wealth has been the scale of the aggregate increase in its 
value; since 2006–08 total financial wealth in Great Britain has increased by more than 60% in 
real terms (from £1.4 trillion to £2.3 trillion) in current CPI-adjusted prices. This represents a 
remarkable increase in the wealth families hold. Bangham and Leslie (2020) and Mulheirn 
(2020) show that the increase in financial wealth over this period has been overwhelmingly 
driven by changes in asset prices rather than active saving by individuals. 
Figure 6 shows the estimated share of families’ change in financial wealth as a result of changes 
in financial asset prices and financial market yields. This analysis exploits the longitudinal nature 
of the WAS. Concretely, the change in financial wealth of each family is calculated for each 
adjacent two-year period of the survey. A counterfactual financial wealth value is calculated by 
applying the average returns observed for a granular breakdown in financial asset classes over 
the relevant two-year period. Between 2008–10 to 2010–12, for example, 93% of the average 
change in families’ financial wealth could be accounted for by changing asset prices and financial 
market yields. The remaining wealth change is the net saving of the family over this period. 
This fact is important context for understanding how wealth has changed in the UK: to a large 
extent, wealth gains for families have accrued as a result of already holding wealth – wealth 
gains have been passive rather than requiring active saving. This also is important for any 
government considering the taxation of wealth as people are likely to feel it is more justifiable 
 
19 This includes both cash ISAs (which would be more similar to savings assets in this taxonomy) and stocks 
and shares ISAs. We have included both within the ‘safe assets’ group because both these ISA accounts 




for a government to tax ‘unearned’ gains in wealth rather than those which come about through 
‘virtuous’ action like working more or saving (Sachweh and Eicher, 2020; Rowlingson, Sood and 
Tu, 2020).  
FIGURE 6: SHARE OF TOTAL AVERAGE GAINS IN FINANCIAL WEALTH FROM CHANGES IN ASSET PRICES: 
GB 
 
Notes: Total changes in family financial wealth is measured between each two-year sample of the WAS. This is 
compared to a counterfactual change in wealth predicted by average financial returns for a granular breakdown of 
assets. This is then used to calculate the share of the observed change in wealth that would on average have resulted 
from financial returns. 
Source: Bangham and Leslie (2020). 
 
Increasing financial wealth has also tended to accrue to the already wealthy. As already shown, 
wealthier households tend to hold financial assets which have more risk but also tend to have 
higher average returns. In simple terms, a household holding a portfolio of company shares will 
have experienced a larger increase in wealth than one who held the same wealth in a savings 
account which in turn had a higher return than cash (see also Bach, Calvet and Sodini, 2020; 
Fagereng et al., 2020). Figure 7 presents a crude estimate of this in-built acceleration of wealth 
inequality whereby richer households will tend to experience faster gains in wealth. This 
estimate is calculated as the weighted average return for the average financial portfolio for a 
family within each decile based on granular financial asset classes. This is not an estimate of the 
actual return experienced by families because real returns will diverge from the average, and 
this divergence may differ across the wealth distribution.20 Saez and Zucman (2016) argue that 
divergences in returns across the wealth distribution has been one of the most important 
drivers in rising wealth inequality in the US over the past few decades. 
 
20 Indeed, Fagereng et al. (2020) show that richer households in Norway tended to achieve higher than 
average returns within asset classes. Similarly, Bach, Calvet and Sodini (2020), show that returns on 
wealth are highly persistent and are positively related to existing wealth levels. The estimates presented 




















FIGURE 7: MEAN ANNUAL FINANCIAL ASSET RETURN BASED ON DIFFERENCES IN PORTFOLIO 
COMPOSITION, BY FAMILY NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: A family’s financial return is calculated as an average of the observed average annual financial returns for a 
granular set of financial assets weighted by their financial asset portfolio composition. Each family’s calculated 
financial return is average within net family total wealth deciles. This does not show the actual returns experienced 
by each family as this is not observed in the WAS data. 
Source: Bangham and Leslie (2020). 
Pension Wealth 
Financial wealth is not the only category of wealth which has experienced increases in value 
over the past decade. Aggregate private pension wealth has also increased in value by more than 
60% since 2006–2008 (ONS, 2019a). It is important to distinguish between increases in pension 
wealth which are driven by an increase in the value of assets held by pension funds – which can 
reflect both increases in pension saving as well as interest earned on invested assets – and 
changes in the annuity and discount rates used to calculate the present value of DB pensions 
and pensions in payment. The drivers of increased DC pension wealth are similar to those 
affecting financial wealth because the majority of assets underlying the value of pension funds 
are financial assets. In particular, the secular decline in interest rates around the world as central 
banks cut rates and conducted quantitative easing to counteract the post-financial crisis 
economic slowdown, has lifted the price of financial assets around the world.21 However, the 
value of DB pension wealth can fluctuate in the absence of any changes to expected income 
streams, as a result of economic factors which affect the discount rate and the annual income 
that can be bought with a pension pot of a given size.  
A significant proportion of the change in pension wealth over time can be explained by changes 
in these external factors, rather than changes in the value of pension funds. For example, 
between 2014-16 and 2016-18, aggregate pension wealth increased by £0.9tn (17%), of which 
81% was explained by an increase in the value of DB pensions and pensions in payment (ONS, 
2019a). Of this increase, 59% was explained by changes in annuity rates and the discount rate, 
rather than changes in the income individuals derive, or expect to derive, from their pension. In 
fact, aggregate pension wealth in 2016-18 would be 32% lower if annuity/discount rates were 
 

























fixed at 2006-08 levels.22 There is an important distinction to be made between increases in 
wealth attributable to an increase in saving, and increases in wealth attributable to falling 
interest rates, as the latter has no effect on the standard of living individuals can expect to have 
in retirement (Mulheirn, 2020), though it does still have distributional consequences.  
Over time, the annuity rate – the value used to convert a pension pot into an annual income 
stream – has declined.23 This means that purchasing a given income stream has required a higher 
equivalent DC pension pot, and the value of DB pension wealth has therefore increased. 
Simultaneously, there have been changes in the discount rate used to calculate the present 
value of future income streams. The average discount rate used rose from 5.5% in 2006-08 to 
6.8% in 2010-12, before falling to 5.2% in 2016-18. A rise in the discount rate reduces the 
present value of future income payments, having a negative effect on the value of DB pension 
wealth between 2006-08 and 2010-12, and a positive effect subsequently.   
An important difference between financial wealth and pension wealth is that rises in pension 
wealth levels have a lower impact on relative inequality because pension wealth is held more 
equally across the wealth distribution. 
Property Wealth 
Property wealth gains have been much lower over the past decade, rising by just 14% in real 
terms. While interest rates falls push up property prices all else equal, and explain a large part 
of the rise in property values (Mulheirn, 2019; 2020; Miles and Monro, 2019), falls in mortgage 
rates have tended to be smaller than the falls central bank rates. Outside the South of England, 
real house prices have been largely flat since the pre-financial crisis peaks, limiting the gains that 
many families have experienced in property wealth. The relatively slow growth in property 
wealth is a major driver of the declining share of wealth in the middle of the distribution, as 
property wealth makes up a much larger share of wealth for middle-wealth families (Figure 4). 
Demography 
As we have shown, the major driver of the changing size and distribution of wealth has been the 
returns to financial and pension wealth and the (relative) lack of returns to property wealth over 
the past decade. But there is another potentially important factor: demographic changes – 
particularly the ageing population. An individual’s wealth changes substantially over the course 
of their life, with families tending to build up wealth over working age before drawing down 
wealth somewhat in retirement (D’Arcy and Gardiner, 2017). The UK population has been 
ageing and is expected to continue to do so; between 2006 and 2019 the share of the population 
between 20 and 39 years old fell from 27.3% to 26.3% and is expected to fall to 24.5% by 2040 
(ONS, 2019b). There has been a commensurate increase in older workers and retired people. 
This would naturally lead to a shift in the distribution of wealth however, as shown in Figure 8, 
the estimated effect of the ageing population has been small relative to the scale of the overall 
shift in wealth shares across the wealth distribution. 
 




23 An annuity rate of 0.05 implies that a £100,000 pension pot could buy annual pension payments of 




FIGURE 8: ESTIMATED CHANGE IN SHARE OF WEALTH FOR EACH NET FAMILY WEALTH DECILE DUE TO 
POPULATION AGEING: GB 
 
Notes: These estimates are calculated by reweighting the WAS sample from 2006–2008 to match the 2019 age 
distribution and the 2016–2018 WAS sample to match the 2040 projected age distribution. This estimate therefore 
abstracts from cohort effects. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets survey; ONS population estimates.  
3.4 Characteristics of high-wealth households 
Much of the political focus on inequality in the UK and around the world focusses on the people 
who are at the top of the distribution. This section tries to explore the characteristics of families 
which could be considered high-wealth. As high-wealth is a subjective term, we use five 
thresholds as markers of high wealth families: families where the per adult net wealth exceeds 
£250,000, £500,000, £1 million, £2 million and £5 million. These thresholds broadly range from 
households in the top 40% of the wealth distribution to the top 1%. In practice, this analysis is 
also useful for understanding the characteristics of families which may be subject to plausible 
thresholds for a net wealth tax. As such we might also be interested in the characteristics of 
those with wealth above these thresholds for a more restrictive definition of wealth that could 
be adopted for a wealth tax; Appendix E reproduces the results below where total wealth is 
defined to exclude wealth from main residential properties and pensions. 
Demographic characteristics 
There are large differences in the probability of an individual living in a high wealth family across 
age and sex (Figure 9a and b). Men are more likely than women to live in high-wealth families, 
largely reflecting the fact that single men are more likely to be high wealth than single women.  
Older people are also much more likely to live in high wealth families. This is unsurprising given 
the strong life-cycle effects in wealth (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). Wealth is a lifetime concept, 
and it is important to recognise that what is considered ‘wealthy’ may be quite different for a 20 
year-old compared to someone who is middle-aged. The same level of wealth can put an 
individual at very different places in the wealth distribution of different age groups (Huggett, 
1996). As well as a rising mean, inequality in (financial) wealth also increases with age (Deaton 
and Paxson, 1994; De Nardi, 2004; Storesletten et al., 2004). For example, median family wealth 














at the 99th percentile of the wealth distribution for a 20-24 year-old, but only the 24th 
percentile of the wealth distribution for a 60-64 year-old.24 However, it is important to note that 
this variation in wealth by age reflects not only lifecycle effects, but also cohort effects whereby 
older generations were able to accumulate wealth at a faster rate than younger generations 
(Bourquin, Joyce and Sturrock, 2020).  
The biggest disparity in high-wealth families by age is for those with per-adult wealth above 
£2 million, where families are much more likely to be late working age or early retirement. 
However, the pattern switches at a threshold of £5 million to having much less variation by age. 
This is consistent with the lifecycle consumption-smoothing motivation for savings being a less 
important driver of wealth accumulation and decumulation at this high level of wealth. 
In Appendix F, we present additional evidence on the relationship between age and wealth, 
including on the geographical distribution and composition of wealth among those in the pre-
retirement phase (aged 55-64), when wealth holdings are at their peak. If individuals smooth 
consumption over their life, then differences in this measure of wealth capture the differences 
in permanent consumption, which is likely to be a good proxy for welfare (Browning and 
Crossley, 2010; Attanasio and Weber, 2010). Differences in wealth across individuals are 
therefore indicative of lifetime differences in economic welfare, as wealth measured at its peak 
is informative of the total amount of resources available to individuals over their life-cycle.  
However, there is some evidence of higher savings rates among those with high levels of lifetime 
income (relative to those with lower levels), implying that differences in wealth at retirement 
might overstate differences in lifetime consumption (Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2005; Bozio et 
al,. 2017).  
FIGURE 9A: SHARE OF AGE AND SEX GROUP THAT LIVE IN HIGH-WEALTH FAMILIES (ABOVE £250,000 
PER ADULT): GB 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family. Figure E1 shows this graph using 
an alternative definition of wealth that excludes main homes and pension wealth.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
 





FIGURE 9B: SHARE OF AGE AND SEX GROUP THAT LIVE IN HIGH-WEALTH FAMILIES (ABOVE £2 MILLION 
PER ADULT): GB 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family. Figure E2 shows this graph using 
an alternative definition of wealth that excludes main homes and pension wealth.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
Additionally, the variation in wealth holdings between households of different ethnicities is 
striking, and is under-studied due to the scarcity of relevant data. Figure 10 shows the 
proportion of households with total net wealth above £250,000 and above £500,000.25  It shows 
that households whose Household Reference Person is of White ethnicity are most likely to 
have total net wealth of £500,000 or more, closely followed by those of Indian ethnicity.26 The 
sample size precludes us from examining all of the ethnic minority groups available in the data 
individually, but Figure 10 can tell us that households of Black African ethnicity are least likely 
to have net wealth over the £500,000 threshold, and four times less likely than those of White 
ethnicity.  
 
25 Sample sizes become too small to present results for higher wealth thresholds. It is also important to 
note that this is a different unit of analysis from the other charts in this section, as a result of needing to 
use a more data-secure version of the WAS dataset to conduct analysis by ethnicity. 
26 Ethnic group is based on the Household Reference Person’s reported ethnicity – this is the survey-
designated primary adult within the household. Where the individuals within a couple have different 




FIGURE 10: SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS ABOVE WEALTH THRESHOLDS WITHIN ETHNICITY GROUPS, BY 
ETHNICITY OF HOUSEHOLD REFERENCE PERSON 
 
Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family. Individuals reporting Chinese, 
Mixed and Other ethnicities are combined due to restrictions on the minimum sample size that can be analysed. 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Social Survey Division. (2020). Wealth and Assets Survey, Waves 1-5 and Rounds 
5-6, 2006-2018: Secure Access. [data collection]. 6th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6709. DOI: 
http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6709-5 
Geography 
Another characteristic of interest is the geographic distribution of high wealth families. As 
Figure 11 shows, the South East of England has the highest number of high-wealth families, with 
well over 3 million adults living in families with net wealth per adult over £250,000. The North 
East is the region with the lowest proportion of high-wealth families. Figure 12 shows the share 
of the total number of families which are above the wealth threshold coming from each region. 
This shows that the large regional disparity in high-wealth families magnifies as the threshold 
increases. For example, 14% of all families with per-adult wealth above £250,000 are in London 
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FIGURE 11: NUMBER OF HIGH-WEALTH INDIVIDUALS BY THRESHOLD LEVEL, CALCULATED AT THE 
FAMILY LEVEL: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family. Figure E3 shows this graph using 
an alternative measure of wealth which excludes main homes and pension wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
FIGURE 12: SHARE OF ALL FAMILIES ABOVE WEALTH THRESHOLD BY REGION: GB 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family. Figure E4 shows this graph using 
an alternative measure of wealth which excludes main homes and pension wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
Volatility 
A natural question is how stable the group of high wealth families is over time. In other words, 
how frequently does a high wealth family become a lower wealth family or vice versa. As 
Figure 13 shows, there is relatively little churn between families lower in the wealth 
distribution: just 7% of families in the bottom half of the wealth distribution move into the top 
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two years later, and most of the entry and exit from this group is to the next decile. We look at 
mobility over this relatively short time period because it best represents the possible regular 
change in the population of families covered by a wealth tax that we might expect. Viewing the 
movement of families across the wealth distribution over a longer time period results would 
result in higher mobility, largely reflecting life-cycle effects (as highlighted by Figures 9a and b) 
and intergenerational transfers (which are only partially covered by the WAS, making further 
analysis beyond the scope of this paper) rather than movements due to volatility in wealth 
holdings. However, there is more churn in wealth in the upper-middle of the wealth distribution, 
similar to findings of Hurst et al. (1998) in the US, where a much higher proportion of those in 
the ninth decile move up or down the wealth distribution, over the relatively short two-year 
period, than in the lower half of the wealth distribution. 
FIGURE 13: PROPORTION OF FAMILIES MOVING BETWEEN WEALTH GROUPS OVER TWO YEARS 
 
Notes: Observations for families who appear in both the 2014–2016 and 2016–2018 WAS samples are linked 
between the two samples. Their position in the wealth distribution is recorded in both and the share of households 
moving between groups is shown. The sample is weighted to account for differential sample attrition based on a 
probit model including observed characteristics including family type, age and education. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
Asset composition 
Unsurprisingly, there are big differences in the types of assets held by the average family above 
each wealth threshold. Figure 14 shows the average share of total assets from each broad asset 
class for families above each wealth threshold. There is a big step-change between families 
above £2 million per-adult wealth and £5 million where the relative importance of business and 
financial assets is much higher for the very wealthiest families. This has important implications 
for policymakers considering implementing a wealth tax; if the wealth tax threshold is set at a 
low level, the biggest sources of revenue would be property wealth and pension wealth 
(excluding these asset-types would reduce the tax base by 80%), in contrast, under a very high 






FIGURE 14: COMPOSITION OF NET WEALTH BY GROUPS CAPTURED BY EACH THRESHOLD: GB, 2016–
2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the family level – single or couple adults and any dependent children within a 
household. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, pension assets, business assets and an 
adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, collectibles, etc). Figure E5 shows this graph 
using an alternative measure of wealth which excludes main homes and pension wealth. 





4. Adjusting for data deficiencies 
4.1 Adjusting for high wealth families 
One of the major challenges with understanding the size and distribution of wealth, particularly 
in any country without a wealth tax (and so comprehensive administrative wealth data), is 
deficiencies in the data. Aggregate wealth measured in WAS using our preferred definition is 
£14.4 trillion, but this is likely to be an under-estimate of true wealth in the UK.27 There are good 
reasons to think that wealthier households are less likely to respond to surveys such as the WAS. 
For example, wealthier households will tend to have more complicated set of assets and 
liabilities, making responding to the survey more time consuming and difficult. The incentive 
payments offered to engage in the survey will also be relatively less valuable to these 
households.28 Item non-response where survey respondents fail to include some of their assets 
is also a source of concern. The reasons leading to lower high-wealth response rates will tend to 
magnify the higher up the wealth distribution a family lies. This means there is a greater chance 
that the very wealthiest people in the UK will not be captured by the sample leading to a 
significant gap in the estimated total UK wealth and how much of wealth is held at the top of the 
wealth distribution. 
In order to explore the size of the potential under-coverage of high-wealth in the WAS, we turn 
to the best available summary of the wealthiest families in the UK – the Sunday Times Rich List 
(STRL). This is an annual publication which attempts to identify the 1,000 richest people or 
families that predominately live or work in the UK (we turn to the issues of primary address, 
citizenship and tax residency location later). The data is compiled in such a way so as to 
represent a plausible lower-bound estimate of each family’s wealth (Watts, 2020) – and 
amounts to a total wealth value of £700 billion. The STRL takes a cautious approach to valuing 
wealth in a number of ways. First, not all assets are included – data is primarily based on private 
and public business assets as well as known land holdings and other items (such as art holdings). 
Private financial assets (excluding shares) will largely not be captured as there is no available 
data in order to base their wealth estimates. Given the composition of assets highlighted for the 
wealthiest observations in the WAS, this suggests that there could be significant additional 
wealth not captured by the STRL. There is also some risk that individuals who keep their wealth 
private, by holding wealth via trusts for example, may be excluded from the list. Second, owners 
of companies known to have high levels of debt or negative profits are excluded from the list, in 
order to limit the over-estimation of wealth through the under-estimation of liabilities. Third, 
private businesses are valued at a relatively low multiple of earnings (10 to 12 times recent 
earnings compared to 20 times for FTSE 250 companies).  
Combining the WAS with the 2017 and 2018 editions of the STRL – which provide the best 
chronological overlap with the 2016-18 WAS interview period – we see that the top wealth 
observations in the WAS sample overlap with the STRL; the WAS includes observations for two 
households with wealth above £100 million.29 This suggests that the WAS is managing to sample 
some households at the very top of the UK’s wealth distribution. In fact, when accounting for 
the weighting of households in the WAS which overlap with the STRL, it appears that the WAS 
 
27 The official estimate of total wealth in the UK produced by the ONS is £14.6 trillion, but they use a 
different definition which excludes business wealth and uses the full replacement cost for physical wealth 
(rather than our estimated current value based on taking 25% of the replacement cost). 
28 The ONS provide an ‘incentive’ payment of between £10 and £15 worth of vouchers for each survey. 
29 The most recent version of the publicly available version of the WAS microdata censors some 




roughly captures the correct number of households above the minimum threshold to be in the 
STRL. 
Despite the coverage of high-wealth families in the WAS, it is likely that it is not fully capturing 
total household wealth in the UK. This is because the very wealthy observations in the WAS are 
not fully representative of the wealth of those captured by the STRL. Indeed, the weighted total 
wealth of these two top households is just under £300 billion, compared to £700 billion in the 
STRL. This implies that at a minimum, the WAS underestimates wealth at the top by £400 billion. 
This is because the very wealthy observations in the WAS do not span the range of the STRL 
distribution: given the wide range of wealth values in the STRL, the WAS observations that do 
overlap with the top have wealth levels far below the top of the STRL. In addition, it is likely the 
wealthiest families have large variations in the composition of their assets: the WAS 
observations may not be representative of ‘typical’ top-wealth families. 
4.2 Pareto distribution 
Approach 
The analysis presented so far is only indicative of the minimum size of the potential missing 
wealth. In order to fully estimate the value of missing wealth we follow the approach set out by 
Vermeulen (2018), who fits a Pareto distribution to the top tail of the wealth distribution.30 The 
intuition is as follows. Theory tells us that the top tail of the (true) wealth distribution is likely to 
follow a Pareto distribution (Jones, 2015; Benhabib and Bisin, 2018), but does not specify the 
key parameters. The observed distribution of wealth departs from the true distribution because 
of the under-coverage of wealth in the survey data. However, by combining this with 
information contained in the Sunday Times Rich List, and the assumption that the true 
distribution is Pareto, we can estimate the index parameter (see below) and hence recover 
information about the wealth that is ‘missing’ from the survey. 
Precisely, the assumption that the top tail of the wealth distribution follows a Pareto 
distribution indicates that it has a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) with 
the following functional form:  






defined over [𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛, ∞), where 𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the Pareto threshold (the lowest value of wealth above 
which a Pareto distribution holds), and 𝛼 > 0 is the Pareto index which determines the exact 
shape of the distribution. This implies that the share of households with wealth above a certain 
threshold, 𝑤, will be proportional to that threshold raised to a power.31 In finite populations, the 
proportion of households with wealth above some level, 𝑤, is constructed as the number of 
households with wealth above 𝑤, 𝑁(𝑤), divided by the total number of households above the 










30 Bach, Thiemann and Zucco (2019) also follow a similar approach using the Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey for France, Germany and Spain.  
31 Hence the Pareto distribution is also known as a power-law probability distribution. See Jones (2015) 
for a full explanation of the mathematical form of the Pareto distribution and its relationship to the 




where 𝑤𝑖  denotes the wealth of a sample observation, 𝑖.  
Taking logs of both sides, we see that the power law relationship implied by a Pareto distribution 
entails a linear relationship between the log wealth of a household, and the log of their rank in 
the distribution. Visually, when a household’s rank in the wealth distribution is plotted against 
their wealth in log-log space, the data points should be approximated by a straight line. Figure 
15 show this property holds in our combined WAS-STRL data. This empirical verification that 
wealth follows a Pareto distribution (as theory suggests) has been provided in a number of other 
contexts (Levy and Solomon, 1997; Davies and Shorrocks, 2000; Kopczuk and Saez, 2004; Klass 
et al., 2006; Ogwang, 2011; Bach, Thiemann and Zucco, 2019), including for the UK (Vermeulen, 
2018). What is new here, as we describe below, are the precise data and methods we use, which 
we argue provide a more accurate picture of wealth in the UK.  
Assuming the Pareto law holds in the UK wealth distribution, we can estimate the exact shape 
of the distribution – governed by the value of 𝛼 – using our data. The Pareto distribution implies 
that as you move up the wealth distribution, the density of households declines at a specific rate. 
If there is substantial under-coverage at the top of the survey data, the density of households 
will decline faster than it should according to the underlying Pareto distribution. The STRL data 
provide additional observations of high-wealth households, which we can use to update our 
estimate of the specific rate at which the density of households should decline, and hence the 
shape of the underlying distribution.  
Since the relationship we are interested in is linear (in logs), we can estimate α as the coefficient 
on log wealth from an OLS regression. Vermeulen (2018) proposes a method for estimating 
Pareto distributions using survey weights, and uses this to fit a Pareto distribution to Wave 2 
(2008-10) of the WAS combined with data from the Forbes billionaires list. We replicate this 
approach, using updated data from the WAS (Round 6, 2016-18) combined with the STRL for 
2020. The aim in Vermeulen (2018) is to compare fitted distributions for a number of countries, 
whereas our goal is to produce the most accurate estimate of the distribution for the UK 
specifically. The STRL is therefore preferable as a data source, provides much richer information 
on the top tail of the UK wealth distribution with 1000 observations, while the Forbes 
billionaires list only includes 41 UK residents in 2020.  
We estimate the Pareto distribution using a combined sample of the WAS and the STRL. In 
constructing this sample, we remove the two WAS households that overlap with the STRL, to 
avoid double counting this wealth. We do not re-weight the data to account for the inclusion of 
the STRL. This is because the combined weight of the two omitted households is roughly 
equivalent to the number of STRL observations – which we assume each represent one 
household,32 and so this adjustment has very little effect on the overall population total.  
In fitting a distribution to this combined sample, a necessary assumption is that households in 
the STRL are drawn from the same underlying wealth distribution as households in the WAS. 
This requires that (i) wealth be measured using a common definition in both data sources, and 
(ii) that there is a consistent measure of ‘units’ who hold this wealth. However, without 
adjustment this is not the case. First, the asset classes covered are different: the WAS data 
provide a comprehensive account of all assets and liabilities while the STRL is primarily based 
on business assets with some additional assets added where available. Second, the STRL 
observations are taken at a broad family level, and this often includes more than two adults and 
their dependent children (the definition of family used in our WAS analysis). For example, in the 
 




2020 rich list, the Barclay brothers are listed jointly at 17th, but were they to be part of the WAS 
survey, they would be treated as separate households.  
To address the first issue, we create a measure of wealth in the WAS which most closely relates 
to the coverage of assets in the STRL. Specifically, we combine private business assets with 
domestic and foreign shares as well as non-savings bonds, which are recorded as financial 
wealth in the WAS. This approach will be imperfect because the publicly available information 
upon which the STRL is based will not capture this exact definition of wealth for all observations. 
Appendix G provides results based on alternative definitions of wealth as a robustness check. In 
reconciling the definitions in this way, we differ from Vermeulen (2018) who, as far as we know, 
fits a distribution based on total wealth in the WAS. We argue that a Pareto distribution 
provides a closer fit to the top tail of the wealth distribution after reconciling these definitional 
differences. This can be seen visually by comparing Figure 15 – where the data points can be 
approximated by a straight line – with Figure G2 in Appendix G which uses total wealth for 
individuals in the WAS.  
To address the second issue of differences in units, we use WAS data at the household level 
(rather than the family level as with previous analysis). While there is relatively little empirical 
difference between the data aggregated at a family and household level (particularly at the top 
of the distribution where households are less likely to include multiple adults outside of 
couples), the maximal definition of the unit of analysis used by the STRL will be best 
approximated, albeit imperfectly with household data from the WAS. 
The OLS regression used to estimate the exact shape of the Pareto distribution is as follows:  






) = 𝐶 − 𝛼 ln(𝑤𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖  
where 𝑖 denotes the 𝑖th household in the combined WAS-STRL sample, when households are 
ranked in descending wealth order;  𝑁𝑓𝑖̅̅ ̅̅  is the average sample weight of the first 𝑖 households 
(all households with wealth above household 𝑖; ?̅? is the average sample weight of all households 




adjustment to the rank is based on Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), who show this reduces the bias 
in OLS estimation of the Pareto index. See Vermeulen (2018, equation 10) for a full derivation 
of the above equation. 
Estimated ‘missing’ wealth  
Figure 15 shows the fitted Pareto distribution using our definition of business wealth from the 
WAS combined with the STRL, for observations with total business wealth above £1m. We take 
£1m as the threshold above which a Pareto distribution applies. In practice, the estimated 
Pareto distribution is not particularly sensitive to the choice of threshold, which we show in 
Table G1. It is clear that a straight line approximates the relationship between household wealth 
and rank in the distribution well in log-log space, suggesting a Pareto distribution holds.  
We can calculate the total value of wealth held in the top tail based on the predicted wealth of 
individuals along the fitted Pareto distribution.33 After updating our estimate of wealth held 
above the Pareto threshold, we can add this to total wealth below the threshold to update our 
estimate of total wealth in the UK. Doing so suggests that the combined STRL and WAS 
 




observations modestly underestimate aggregate household wealth by around £360 billion. That 
is, after adding wealth in the STRL that is not captured in the WAS to the total, aggregate wealth 
is underestimated by around 2.4%. Adding wealth captured in the STRL and the additional 
Pareto adjustment to total wealth captured in the WAS increases estimated total wealth by 5%, 
just over half of which comes from incorporating the STRL alone. It is important to note that this 
does not necessarily imply that families at the top of these samples have more wealth than is 
reported; it might just as well be that there are more wealthy families higher up the top tail who 
are not being recorded in the data.  
FIGURE 15: ESTIMATED PARETO DISTRIBUTION USING WAS BUSINESS ASSETS AND THE STRL 
 
Source ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey; Sunday Times Rich List. 
Implications of adjusting wealth 
It is impossible to reproduce the earlier descriptive analysis of household wealth after making 
the adjustments suggested by the Pareto estimates. This is because the STRL data available to 
us does not include detailed information on the characteristics of the family members, nor does 
it provide a breakdown of asset types. Nevertheless, the high-wealth observations from the 
WAS and the STRL data suggest that very high-wealth families hold a much higher proportion 
of their wealth in the form of private business assets and financial wealth (this is by construction 
in the STRL). Figure 16 presents indicative estimates of the composition of wealth if we assume 
that the additional wealth from the STRL and the Pareto adjustment fall completely within the 
financial and business categories – this is obviously a simplification but demonstrates that were 
surveys to fully capture wealth in the UK, the importance of financial and business assets could 
be significantly higher than is currently thought. 
Similarly, the indicative additional wealth total estimated here would substantially alter our 
understanding of the level of wealth inequality. Taking our updated estimate of additional, 
unobserved wealth in the top tail from the previous section, we can allocate this to the top 10% 




excess of the £1m Pareto threshold are in the top 1% of the overall wealth distribution. 
Returning to the measure used at the start of this paper, Figure 17 provides an adjusted estimate 
of the shares of wealth held by the wealthiest 10% and 1% respectively. Adjusted estimates 
suggest very substantial increases in the share of wealth at the top of the distribution; the 
estimated share of wealth held by the top 10% rises from 51% to 55% and the top 1% share rises 
from 18% to 23%.34 
This corrected top share of 23% for the top 1% is significantly higher than the 14-18% estimated 
in Vermeulen (2018). There are two key reasons for this. First, our wealth definition includes 
business assets and adjusts the value of physical wealth, both of which depart from the standard 
WAS definition of wealth (see Section 2.4). As a result, our survey estimates of top shares are 
higher than Vermeulen before augmentation and Pareto adjustment. A comparison of the 
unadjusted top 1% share for Wave 2 (2008-10) gives 19% using our wealth definition and 13% 
for Vermeulen (2018).  
Second, in our preferred specification we fit a Pareto distribution to business wealth, rather 
than total wealth. This reconciles the wealth definition used across the WAS and STRL, which is 
necessary to meet the Pareto assumption that the observed wealth across samples is drawn 
from the same distribution. Doing this gives lower estimates of the Pareto index, 𝛼, and hence 
higher levels of missing wealth than if total wealth is used for the WAS observations (see Table 
G1). The additional wealth from using the STRL and our Pareto adjustment adds around 5pp to 
the top 1% share in our estimates. This is similar to the upper estimate of added wealth from the 
Forbes Rich List and Pareto adjustment in Vermeulen (2018), though five times the lower end 
(1pp) estimate in that paper.  
FIGURE 16: COMPOSITION OF WEALTH IN THE UK AND INDICATIVE ESTIMATES BASED ON INCLUDING 
STRL DATA AND A TOP-DOWN PARETO DISTRIBUTION-IMPLIED ADJUSTMENT 
 
Notes: The additional wealth in from the STRL and that implied by a fitted Pareto distribution (for WAS and STRL 
observations above £1 million in business wealth) are assumed to be additional financial and business assets. 
Source ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey; Sunday Times Rich List. 
 
34 It is possible that wealth is systematically under-reported across the wealth distribution in the WAS, 
however there is limited evidence upon which to draw to investigate that possibility – hence the focus in 




FIGURE 17: SHARE OF NET PERSONAL WEALTH HELD BY RICHEST 1% AND 10%, INCLUDING 
ADJUSTMENTS USING THE SUNDAY TIMES RICH LIST: UK AND GB 
 
Notes: World inequality database estimates refer to the whole of the UK and the WAS-based estimates exclude 
Northern Ireland. Due to changes in the coverage of business assets between survey rounds in the WAS, these results 
are adjusted using the latest observation of private business wealth shares held by the top 10% and 1% in the most 
recent round of the survey (2016-18) and imputed backwards to provide a consistent estimate. The adjusted WAS 
estimates add in the total wealth held by families covered by the Sunday Times Rich List as well as the upper estimate 
from the fitted Pareto distribution. The definition of wealth used for the long-run estimates is not consistent with that 
from the WAS; Appendix A provides alternative estimates of top wealth shares which address some of these 
differences.  
Source: Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 2018, obtained from the World Inequality Database, 2020; ONS, Wealth and 
Assets Survey. 
4.3  Other data deficiencies 
Private business wealth 
There are other deficiencies with the data that are available which could have a material impact 
on our understanding of household wealth in the UK. Perhaps the most significant of these is the 
measurement of private business wealth. As shown in Section 3, business assets are a relatively 
small part of household wealth for the vast majority of households only becoming a material 
component for the wealthiest 10% of households. Private business assets make up a relatively 
small part of the WAS questionnaire and there is some evidence that there could be under-
coverage of private business wealth.35 
A large challenge with collecting data on private business wealth is that, in many cases, there 
will not be an obvious market price for the business. The WAS asks respondents who own or 
partially own a business to value what their share is worth were they to sell the business. There 
is likely to be an element of error, although due to very limited information in the WAS about 
the business (e.g. detailed balance sheets and revenue data are unavailable) it is impossible to 
 
35 It is our view that the structure of the survey could lead to misclassification of assets or double counting 
of assets for some families. For example, some households may consider particular business assets to be 
personal wealth – for example a plumber could report their van as a personal car only, and so not report 
it as a business asset (having reported it as a personal one), or may report it again as part of the value of 




derive alternative estimates of business value. Roughly half of respondents to the survey who 
said they owned or partially owned a business also said that the market value of the business 
was zero. While it is likely that a significant number of businesses, particularly sole operators, 
will have minimal resale value it seems implausible that half of all business have no net value. 
There is also evidence that the coverage of businesses in the WAS falls below the total 
population of businesses in the UK. Figure 18 shows the WAS-implied number of businesses by 
size of business matched to estimates derived from Business Population Estimates from 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2017).36 There appears to be a 
systematic undercount of the total businesses we might expect and this is true across the size of 
businesses – the undercount equates to around 25% of the total business population. A crude 
scaling of those business assets which are observed in the WAS, suggests that full coverage of 
businesses would lead to an additional £175 million of household wealth.37 The scale of this 
undercount is relatively small compared to that suggested by previous analysis and would not 
materially change our understanding of household wealth. 
FIGURE 18: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF UK BUSINESSES BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES EMPLOYED BY THE 
BUSINESS: GB 
 
Source ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey (2016–18); Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Business 
Population Estimate (2017). 
Housing wealth 
While business wealth is under-estimated in the WAS, housing wealth appears to be over-
estimated relative to external data sources such as the Nationwide, ONS, and Halifax house 
price indices, and the national accounts.38 Average house prices were £76,000 higher in the 
WAS than in these house price indices in 2014–16. It is not clear why people should be overly 
optimistic to such an extent, though the WAS does not appear to be the only survey affected by 
this (see Hillyard, Patsios and Feely, 2014, for evidence of a similar pattern in Northern Ireland). 
 
36 The business population estimates are for Great Britain and have been adjusted to match the WAS 
definition of business (e.g. excluding non-profits and public sector corporations) as closely as possible. 
37 It is likely that some of the ‘missing’ businesses are owned by individuals in the STRL and so adding those 
families would already account for some of this gap. 
38 See ONS (2018) for more details on the difference between measures of wealth in WAS and in other 
data sources. In Appendix A, we compare components of wealth, including housing, between the WAS and 




It is possible that this bias could change through the economic cycle. In Appendix A, we consider 
how rescaling housing wealth to match these external figures affects our estimates of the wealth 
distribution.  
Residency and citizenship 
The final material gap in our understanding of wealth in the UK comes from a lack of data on the 
residency, citizenship, and tax status of the individuals covered by the WAS and STRL. The WAS 
sampling methodology is based on addresses in Great Britain which means that for an individual 
to be included they just need to live at an address in Great Britain for at least some of the time. 
The STRL criteria for inclusion are based on having a material connection to the UK – for 
example, Richard Branson, fortieth in the 2020 Rich List, is not a permanent UK resident or UK 
domiciliary but does have businesses that operate in the UK. This has particular relevance for 
policymakers considering introducing wealth taxes: some of the wealth that is captured by both 
the WAS and the STRL will be held by people who are not UK tax residents and therefore could 
fall out of scope of any tax base. Conversely, WAS underestimates housing wealth held by non-
residents and rented out: while the property is included in the sampling frame, and the renters 
who live in it are within the scope of the survey, these renters would not report the property 





This paper describes what we know about UK wealth as well as acknowledging what we do not 
know. A few facts are apparent from our analysis. Household wealth has grown in the UK and is 
very unequally held. These trends have been particularly stark since the financial crisis. Much of 
the gains in household wealth have been in rising financial asset prices (with associated 
increased in pension wealth) leading to a small shift in wealth shares towards the top of the 
wealth distribution. For those households who have become richer over the past decade, most 
of these gains were not as a result of active saving, rather passive accumulation in the value of 
wealth for those families who were already lucky enough to be well-off. This has profound 
implications for any policymaker thinking of introducing a net wealth tax in the wake of the 
coronavirus crisis. 
While we can say a lot about wealth in the UK, there remains significant uncertainty over the 
true scale of wealth in the UK. Survey measures of wealth appear to be under-capturing wealth 
significantly – by as much as 7% according to our preferred estimate. This missing wealth is likely 
to be as a result of underreported business and financial assets.  
More work is needed on data and analysis to properly understand and account for the scale of 
household wealth in the UK. The past decade has seen wealth levels rise remarkably as interest 
rates have fallen. The current economic crisis suggests interest rates are unlikely to revert to 
the average levels seen in the second half of the twentieth century. This means policymakers 
need to grapple with the now embedded gaps between richer and poorer households. A good 
starting point would be to improve our understanding of wealth in the UK with redoubled 
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Appendix A: Comparing WAS to other datasets 
Comparing total wealth 
The ONS official estimate of total wealth in Great Britain 2016–18 is £14.6 trillion. Using our 
definition of wealth, which includes business assets and adjusts the value of physical wealth, we 
estimate total wealth in the WAS at £14.4 trillion. Our concern is that this misses some wealth 
at the top, primarily due to survey under-coverage. In Section 4 we describe our method for 
estimating this missing wealth by adding in wealth captured in the Sunday Times Rich List, and 
using a Pareto adjustment to impute any additional missing wealth. After adjusting for missing 
wealth, we estimate total wealth at £15.1 trillion.  
These estimates are considerably higher than in external data sources. In the national accounts, 
personal sector net worth is just £10.0 trillion in 2017. Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli (2018), 
who estimate total wealth based on inheritance tax data, find £5.5 trillion of UK wealth in 2012. 
Extrapolating this forward to 2017 using annual growth in personal sector net worth from the 
national accounts gives a total of £7.6 trillion in 2017. These discrepancies reflect differences in 
what is included and how this is measured. Table 1 compares each wealth component in our total 
with the corresponding component in the national accounts, though conceptual differences 
make such a comparison extremely difficult. The exclusion of physical wealth in the national 
accounts explains only a small proportion of the difference. Property wealth is around £1.2 
trillion higher in the WAS relative to the national accounts, consistent with the finding that the 
WAS overestimates housing wealth relative to external house price indices (see Section 4.3). 
Below, we consider what happens to our standard and Pareto-adjusted estimates of total wealth 
and top shares when gross housing wealth is rescaled to correct for this over-estimation.  
The largest discrepancy between our estimates and the national accounts is in pension wealth, 
which is over £2 trillion higher in the WAS than in the national accounts. This is despite the fact 
that ‘pension wealth’ in the national accounts also includes the value of life insurance policies, 
which are a component of financial wealth in the WAS. In part, this discrepancy reflects 
differences in the types of pension included. The national accounts exclude unfunded defined 
benefit pensions paid by general government (including civil service pensions, for instance). 
However, this cannot fully explain the difference, as supplementary estimates indicate that 
these pensions were worth only £1.2 trillion in 2018.39 A possible explanation for the variation 
is the different methods used to compute the value of Defined Benefit pensions and pensions in 
payment, which are much harder to value than wealth held in defined contribution pensions (see 
Section 3.3). The formulae used for valuing these types of pension in the WAS is highly sensitive 
to changes in annuity rates, which have fallen significantly since the Financial Crisis. This has 
increased the value of pensions relative to the national accounts, where current annuity rates 
are just one input into a more detailed and comprehensive valuation procedure.   
Excluding pension wealth from both data sources reduces our WAS total (before Pareto 
adjustment) to £8.3 trillion, and the national accounts total to £6.3 trillion. This is much closer 
to the estimate in Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli (2018), which excludes pension wealth. Below, 
we consider how our top share estimates compare to Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli (2018) 
when we exclude pension wealth from our definition.  
 
39 For more details on the pension wealth sources included in the core national accounts and 






TABLE 1 TOTAL WEALTH IN THE WAS AND THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS, £ TRILLION 






Total  14.4 15.1 10.0 
Property wealth (net) 5.1 5.1 3.9 
Pension wealth 6.1 6.1 3.7 
Financial wealth (net) 1.7 1.7 2.4 
Business wealth 1.0 1.0 0.04 
Physical wealth 0.5 0.5 N.A. 
Net STRL adjustment (add 
wealth captured in the STRL 
but not in the WAS) 
N.A. 0.4  
Pareto adjustment N.A. 0.4 N.A. 
Notes: This table does not offer a full reconciliation of national accounts concepts with the WAS, as this is beyond the 
scope of this work. Our definition of ‘business wealth’ in the national accounts includes machinery and equipment, 
cultivated biological resources, intellectual property products, and inventories owned by unincorporated businesses 
that are not used for final consumption by households. This excludes assets held by incorporated businesses, the 
value of which are recorded in the household balance sheet as equities, and are included in financial wealth. Pension 
wealth in the national accounts also includes the value of insurance schemes, which are included under financial 
wealth in the WAS. In this table, we do not take a stance on how STRL wealth and additional Pareto wealth should be 
allocated across different asset classes. In Figure 16, we illustrate what the composition of wealth might look like if 
we assume all STRL and Pareto wealth reflects financial and business wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, Sunday Times Rich List, UK National Accounts. 
A natural question to ask is, if total wealth in the WAS is already higher than in the national 
accounts after reconciling some of the obvious differences, what is this ‘missing wealth’ that we 
are allocating in our Pareto adjustment? Conceptual and methodological differences between 
the national accounts and survey data are endless, and reconciling these to understand how the 
figures compare when we actually compare like-for-like is an important task for future research. 
In the absence of such a reconciliation, it is possible that the missing wealth at the top that we 
estimate in our Pareto adjustment is indeed captured in the national accounts, but that the WAS 
also measures sources of household wealth that the national accounts is not trying to capture, 
or uses valuation methods which produce alternative, higher measures of household wealth.  
We do not believe that the national accounts tell us the ‘true’ value of wealth that we would 
expect to find in the absence of any under-reporting or under-coverage using our WAS-based 
definition of wealth. Our WAS-based wealth total is, in fact, higher than total wealth as 
measured and defined in the national accounts. As a result, we have not taken the approach used 
by Credit Suisse (Davies, Lluberas and Shorrocks, 2019), who fit a Pareto distribution to the top 
tail but rescale total adjusted wealth to target the national accounts total. Nor do we attempt to 
match an external total for business wealth when adjusting on this measure, since no 
comparable total exists. Since the target wealth total is below observed total wealth, this 
approach effectively redistributes wealth from the bottom of the distribution to the top, while 
subtracting rather than adding anything to the total. 
Top shares using alternative measures of wealth 
In this section, we present some alternative estimates of the share of wealth at the top of the 




dimensions: (i) rescaling the value of housing wealth in order to match average house prices 
from Nationwide house price data,40 and (ii) excluding pensions.41 
Rescaling housing wealth has a small impact on top shares (Figure A1). Before adjusting for 
missing wealth at the top, the top 10% (1%) share rises (falls) by 1 percentage point in the period 
of overlap with Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli (2018). Their estimates are based on estates 
data, which presumably does not include overly optimistic estimates of housing wealth.  
FIGURE A1: SHARE OF NET PERSONAL WEALTH HELD BY RICHEST 1% AND 10%, RESCALING HOUSING 
WEALTH AND INCLUDING ADJUSTMENTS USING THE SUNDAY TIMES RICH LIST: UK AND GB  
 
Notes: The WAS estimates are based on scaling gross property wealth in the WAS down by the ratio of the WAS 
average house price in round 5 and the contemporaneous average property price in Nationwide data. This equates to 
a reduction in gross property wealth by around 30 per cent. 
Source: Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 2018, obtained from the World Inequality Database, 2020; ONS, Wealth and 
Assets Survey; Nationwide; Sunday Times Rich List. 
Excluding pension wealth (Fig. A2) raises our top shares significantly. In 2016–18, the top 1% 
share was 26% excluding pension wealth, compared to 18% including pension wealth. This is not 
surprising, given that pension wealth is distributed more equally across the wealth distribution 
than other sources of wealth, such as financial and business wealth (see Figure 4). Excluding 
pension wealth also affects the trend in wealth concentration: top shares of non-pension wealth 
rose significantly between 2008 and 2014, from 23% to 26% for the top 1% and 52% to 58% for 
the top 10%, continuing the rise in wealth inequality observed since the early 1980s. This is 
before taking into account wealth at the top which is missing from the WAS. Our Pareto-
adjusted top shares for 2016–18 for the top 10% (1%) are 61% (31%). 
 
40 The average self-reported house price in the WAS is higher than average UK property prices in other 
data – for example that compiled by Nationwide. This means housing wealth could be overvalued in the 
WAS, for example as a result of survey respondents overestimating the value of their own properties. 
41 The long-run comparison time series in these charts is compiled from inheritance tax data which 
excludes pension wealth. WAS estimates might underestimate top wealth shares relative to the IHT data-




FIGURE A2: SHARE OF NET PERSONAL WEALTH HELD BY RICHEST 1% AND 10%, EXCLUDING PENSIONS 
AND INCLUDING ADJUSTMENTS USING THE SUNDAY TIMES RICH LIST: UK AND GB  
 
Notes: The WAS estimates exclude all pension wealth, including pensions in payment, occupational and personal 
pensions. 
Source: Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 2018, obtained from the World Inequality Database, 2020; ONS, Wealth and 
Assets Survey; Sunday Times Rich List. 
In Figure A3, we combine the adjustments made to our wealth definition in the previous two 
graphs by rescaling housing wealth and excluding pensions. This definition is the most 
consistent with the wealth definition used in Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli (2018). 
Accordingly, we find that top shares using this definition line up closely with the top shares 
found in Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli (2018) during the years in which the series overlap. 
Again, these estimates suggest that the rise in inequality observed since the 1980s has not 
abated in recent years, and if anything has accelerated. 
FIGURE A3: SHARE OF NET PERSONAL WEALTH HELD BY RICHEST 1% AND 10%, EXCLUDING PENSIONS, 
RESCALING HOUSING WEALTH, AND INCLUDING ADJUSTMENTS USING THE SUNDAY TIMES RICH LIST:  
UK AND GB  
 
Notes: The WAS estimates are based on scaling gross property wealth in the WAS down by the ratio of the WAS 
average house price in round 5 and the contemporaneous average property price in Nationwide data. This equates to 
a reduction in gross property wealth by around 30%. The WAS estimates exclude all pension wealth, including 
pensions in payment, occupational and personal pensions. 
Source: Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli, 2018, obtained from the World Inequality Database, 2020; ONS, Wealth and 




Appendix B: Inequality in wealth – individual level 
estimates  
In this Appendix we reproduce some of the distributional analysis presented in the body of the 
paper (Section 3) using individuals as our unit of analysis, rather than family units. 
FIGURE B1: SHARE OF TOTAL NET INDIVIDUAL WEALTH BY EACH NET WEALTH DECILE SINCE 2006–
2008: GB 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the individual level. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, 
pension assets, and an adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, collectibles, etc). Private 
business assets are excluded due to material improvements in the coverage of these assets since the early rounds of 
the survey making cross-round comparisons difficult. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
FIGURE B2: AVERAGE NET INDIVIDUAL WEALTH WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the individual level. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, 
pension assets, business assets and an adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, 
collectibles, etc).  




FIGURE B3: AVERAGE NET INDIVIDUAL WEALTH WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH PERCENTILE FOR THE 
WEALTHIEST 10%: GB, 2016–2018 
 
 Notes: Wealth is measured at the individual level. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, 
pension assets, business assets and an adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, 
collectibles, etc).  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
FIGURE B4: AVERAGE SHARE OF TOTAL NET WEALTH CONTRIBUTED FROM DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES BY 
INDIVIDUAL NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Individuals are allocated to deciles based on wealth measured at individual level. The lowest decile is excluded 
as net wealth is negative. Property wealth here is measured net of mortgage debt and financial wealth is net of other 
financial liabilities.  




Appendix C: Inequality in wealth – household level 
estimates  
In this Appendix we reproduce some of the distributional analysis presented in the body of the 
paper (Section 3) using households as our unit of analysis, rather than family units. 
FIGURE C1: AVERAGE NET HOUSEHOLD WEALTH WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the household level. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, 
pension assets, business assets and an adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, 
collectibles, etc).  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
FIGURE C2: AVERAGE NET HOUSEHOLD WEALTH WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH PERCENTILE FOR THE 
WEALTHIEST 10%: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the household level. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets, 
pension assets, business assets and an adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, 
collectibles, etc).  
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FIGURE C3: AVERAGE SHARE OF TOTAL NET WEALTH CONTRIBUTED FROM DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES BY 
HOUSEHOLD NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: The lowest decile is excluded, as net wealth is negative. Property wealth here is measured net of mortgage 
debt and financial wealth is net of other financial liabilities. 





Appendix D: Inequality in wealth – family level 
estimates excluding main residential property 
wealth and pension wealth 
In this Appendix we reproduce some of the distributional analysis presented in the body of the 
paper (Section 3) using a modified definition of wealth which excludes main residential property 
and/or pension wealth. 
FIGURE D1: AVERAGE NET WEALTH PER ADULT PER FAMILY WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 
2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the family level – single or couple adults and any dependent children within a 
household. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets (excluding primary residence and any 
mortgage attached to it), business assets and an adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, 
collectibles, etc).  




FIGURE D2: AVERAGE NET WEALTH PER ADULT PER FAMILY WITHIN EACH NET WEALTH PERCENTILE FOR 
THE WEALTHIEST 10%: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured at the family level – single or couple adults and any dependent children within a 
household. Total wealth includes net financial assets, net property assets (excluding primary residence and any 
mortgage attached to it), business assets and an adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, 
collectibles, etc).  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
FIGURE D3: AVERAGE SHARE OF TOTAL NET WEALTH, EXCLUDING PRIMARY RESIDENCES AND PENSIONS, 
CONTRIBUTED FROM DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES BY FAMILY NET WEALTH DECILE: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: The lowest three deciles are excluded as net wealth is negative for some components are negative. Property 
wealth here is measured for non-primary residence properties net of their mortgage debt and financial wealth is net 
of other financial liabilities. Pension wealth is excluded. 





Appendix E: Characteristics of high-wealth families 
excluding main property and pension wealth 
In this Appendix, we present evidence on the characteristics of high-wealth families as in the 
main body of the paper (Section 3.4) using an alternative definition of wealth which excludes 
main residential property and pension wealth. 
FIGURE E1: SHARE OF AGE AND SEX GROUP THAT LIVE IN HIGH-WEALTH FAMILIES (ABOVE £250,000 
PER ADULT): GB 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family. Wealth is measured excluding net 
wealth from the primary residence and pension wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
FIGURE E2: SHARE OF AGE AND SEX GROUP THAT LIVE IN HIGH-WEALTH FAMILIES (ABOVE £2 MILLION 
PER ADULT): GB 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family. Wealth is measured excluding net 
wealth from the primary residence and pension wealth. 




FIGURE E3: NUMBER OF HIGH-WEALTH INDIVIDUALS BY THRESHOLD LEVEL, CALCULATED AT THE 
FAMILY LEVEL: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured excluding net wealth from the primary residence and pension wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
FIGURE E4: SHARE OF ALL FAMILIES ABOVE WEALTH THRESHOLD BY REGION: GB 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured excluding net wealth from the primary residence and pension wealth. 




FIGURE E5: COMPOSITION OF NET WEALTH BY GROUPS CAPTURED BY EACH THRESHOLD: GB,  
2016-2018 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured excluding net wealth from the primary residence and pension wealth. It is measured at 
the family level – single or couple adults and any dependent children within a household. Total wealth includes net 
financial assets, net property assets (excluding net wealth from the primary residence), business assets and an 
adjusted measure of physical wealth (including cars, home contents, collectibles, etc). 





Appendix F: Relationship between age and wealth 
In this appendix we present some additional evidence on the relationship between age and 
wealth, and the distribution of wealth among those at the peak of their life-cycle of wealth 
accumulation.  
Table F1 shows where in the distribution an individual who is aged 40-44 with median family 
wealth (£126,000) would be if we were to place them in the wealth distribution for a different 
age group. This highlights the fact that what is considered ‘typical wealth’ for someone aged 
40-44 would be ‘high wealth’ for someone a decade or two younger, and ‘low wealth’ for 
someone a decade or two older. This pattern reflects the life-cycle evolution of wealth 
holdings: people accumulate wealth during the early stages of their working lives, and 
decumulate in retirement.  
TABLE F1: WHERE IN THE CONDITIONAL WEALTH DISTRIBUTION, CONDITIONING ON AGE GROUP, A 40-
44 YEAR OLD WITH MEDIAN FAMILY WEALTH WOULD BE  
Age 
Percentile of distribution which 











Notes: Wealth is measured at the family level, and percentiles are defined relative to the number of families.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
To better understand the distribution of lifetime resources, it is instructive to look at the 
distribution of wealth among individuals at the peak of the accumulation phase, immediately 
before retirement: at this point measured wealth provides a better indication of the total 
amount of resources available to individuals over their life-cycle, which is likely to be a good 
proxy for welfare. This group are also likely to pay a disproportionately large share of any wealth 
tax (as well as other capital taxes), so they are particularly policy relevant (Advani, Hughson and 
Tarrant, 2021). An important caveat here is that wealth accumulation among younger cohorts 
is much lower than it was for the individuals aged 55-65 in our sample, so it is not clear how 
stable these patterns will be over time (Bourquin, Joyce and Sturrock, 2020). 
Figure F1 shows the composition of wealth by asset class across the wealth distribution, as per 
Figure 4, focusing on adults in the pre-retirement phase (aged 55-64). Unsurprisingly, pension 
and property wealth account for a much larger share of wealth for this age group (89%) than for 
the population as a whole (69%), while the role of physical assets diminishes (in relative terms). 
Unlike the general population, those at the lower end of the distribution of adults aged 55-64 




asset among those in the third and fourth decile. This is likely to reflect a combination of the life-
cycle accumulation of wealth, as well as higher rates of home-ownership among older cohorts. 
Strikingly, throughout much of the distribution, adults aged 55-64 hold a consistent share of 
their wealth in a combination of pensions and property (around 90%), with the role of pensions 
in that mix becoming more important higher up the distribution. It is only in the top decile of this 
age group that financial and business wealth start to become more important, accounting for 
20% of wealth. 
FIGURE F1: AVERAGE SHARE OF TOTAL NET WEALTH CONTRIBUTED FROM DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES BY 
FAMILY NET WEALTH DECILE, ADULTS AGED 55-64: GB, 2016–2018 
 
Notes: Individuals are allocated to deciles based on wealth measured at family level. The lowest decile is excluded as 
net wealth is negative. Property wealth here is measured net of mortgage debt and financial wealth is net of other 
financial liabilities.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey. 
Figure F2 illustrates the geographical distribution of high-wealth individuals in the 55-64 age 
range. The pattern is broadly the same as for the population as a whole (Figure 12), with the 
exception of individuals with wealth above £5m, where those aged 55-64 are much more likely 
to live in London compared to other individuals with the same level of wealth.  






Notes: Wealth thresholds are measured as total wealth per adult within the family.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey.  
Appendix G: Sensitivity of Pareto estimation to 
alternative thresholds and definitions 
As discussed in Section 4, there are two key challenges in estimating the Pareto distribution 
which underlies the top tail of the wealth distribution. First, accounting for the difference in 
definition/coverage of wealth between the WAS and the STRL. Second, identifying the 
appropriate threshold above which the true wealth distribution in the UK can be approximated 
with a Pareto distribution. This appendix presents sensitivity analysis for both of these issues.  
Figure G1 and G2 present alternative definitions of wealth in the WAS combined with the STRL 
and the fitted Pareto distribution. Figure G1 restricts wealth in the WAS to only private business 
wealth as we can be confident that this is captured in the STRL as this forms the key input to 
many top-wealth families’ assets. Figure G2 takes the opposite approach and includes all wealth 
identified in the WAS. The definition of wealth used in the main body of the paper remains our 
preferred specification, given the coverage of the STRL. However, these results show that the 
Pareto distribution is a reasonably good approximation regardless of WAS wealth definition. 
Finally, Table G1 tabulates the resulting estimate of wealth missing from the WAS and STRL 
samples, based on the fitted Pareto distribution generated under different wealth definitions 
and thresholds. We observe that the Pareto index is considerably lower when estimated using 
Business (and Financial) assets than when total wealth is used. This is partly because the former 
is much more concentrated than the latter.  
In estimating total wealth, we sum up the predicted values of wealth for each observation in the 
data, according to the fitted Pareto distribution. An alternative method would be to calculate 
the total top tail wealth implied by the form and parameters of the Pareto distribution, which is 
given by 𝑁 ∙
𝛼
𝛼−1
∙ 𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛, where 𝑁 is the sum of household weights above the Pareto threshold and 
𝛼
𝛼−1
∙ 𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the average wealth above the threshold, for 𝛼 > 1. However, for 𝛼 < 1, as in our 
case, a finite solution for the mean does not exist, and so we adopt an empirical approach to 
estimating the total wealth expected to be held by those in the top tail. Even for 𝛼 above but 
close to one, the two approaches can yield very different results. This is because low values of 𝛼 




significant – and often implausible – proportion of wealth in the top tail is held by individuals 
with wealth far exceeding the maximum value observed in the data. This is an important issue to 
consider in using Pareto methods to estimate the top tail of the wealth distribution.  
FIGURE G1: ESTIMATE PARETO DISTRIBUTION USING WAS BUSINESS ASSETS AND THE STRL (LOWER 
BOUND THRESHOLD OF £1 MILLION) 
 
Notes: Estimation suggests there is missing wealth in WAS/STRL relative to the fitted Pareto distribution amounting 
to £470 billion. 





FIGURE G2: ESTIMATED PARETO DISTRIBUTION USING WAS MEASURE OF TOTAL WEALTH AND THE 
STRL (LOWER BOUND THRESHOLD £1 MILLION) 
 
Notes: Estimation suggests there is missing wealth in WAS/STRL relative to the fitted Pareto distribution amounting 
to £950 billion. 
Source ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey; Sunday Times Rich List. 
As discussed in Section 4 of the paper, the Pareto adjustment results are very sensitive to the 
definition of wealth, and to a lesser extent also sensitive to the threshold above which the true 
underlying wealth distribution matches a Pareto distribution. This table provides an indication 
of that sensitivity as well as the key estimation statistic – the Pareto index alpha – which should 
be stable at the appropriate cut-off threshold (Vermeulen, 2018). As the table shows, there is no 
clear indication of the appropriate threshold when total household wealth is used. With our 










TABLE G1: SUMMARY RESULTS FROM PARETO ADJUSTMENT BASED ON DIFFERENT THRESHOLD LEVELS 
AND DEFINITIONS OF WEALTH 
 
Notes: Estimates of additional wealth are similar across different thresholds using our preferred definition of 
business wealth including shares. Excluding shares does not have a significant effect on the estimates. Estimates 
based on total wealth are notably different and relatively more unstable when different thresholds are used.  
Source ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey; Sunday Times Rich List. 
Threshold





500k Business and financial +£330 billion 0.98
1m Business and financial +£360 billion 0.97
2m Business and financial +£400 billion 0.97
3m Business and financial +£430 billion 0.98
4m Business and financial +£440 billion 0.99
5m Business and financial +£440 billion 0.99
500k Business assets only +£460 billion 0.93
1m Business assets only +£470 billion 0.94
2m Business assets only +£490 billion 0.97
3m Business assets only +£490 billion 0.98
4m Business assets only +£480 billion 0.99
5m Business assets only +£470 billion 0.99
500k Total wealth +£1.0 trillion 1.57
1m Total wealth +£950 billion 1.56
2m Total wealth +£220 billion 1.45
3m Total wealth -£150 billion 1.32
4m Total wealth -£250 billion 1.20
5m Total wealth -£230 billion 1.14
6m Total wealth -£170 billion 1.10
7m Total wealth -£90 billion 1.07
8m Total wealth -£50 billion 1.05
9m Total wealth £0 billion 1.04
